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ABSTRACT 
 
SANGWAN KIM: Accounting Quality, Corporate Acquisition, and Financing Decisions 
(Under the direction of Jeffery S. Abarbanell) 
 
 
This paper examines the extent to which the quality of financial accounting information 
disciplines manager interests to align with stockholder interests in corporate acquisition and 
financing decisions. I find that, after controlling for financing constraints, recent performance 
and payout policy, the tendency of firm managers to time the market is significantly 
constrained for firms with high-quality financial accounting information. Further, I find that 
the disciplining impact of accounting information is mostly driven by firms that bid for 
acquisitions financed with stock issuance. I also provide corroborating evidence by 
examining a similar disciplining role of financial accounting information in the seasoned 
public offering markets. I find no such effect for potential acquisitions financed through cash. 
The evidence suggests that high-quality accounting information allows stockholders to 
discipline firm managers that are motivated to take advantage of the misvaluation. Further, 
the results suggest the effectiveness of accounting information as a control mechanism is 
pronounced for firms that pursue more value-decreasing investment projects. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
ACCOUNTING QUALITY, CORPORATE ACQUISITION, AND 
FINANCING DECISIONS 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
 This paper examines the question of whether high-quality financial accounting information 
disciplines managerial market timing of corporate acquisitions. Specifically, I hypothesize that the 
presence of high-quality financial reporting mitigates the manager-stockholder conflict by enhancing 
monitoring and governance mechanisms over managerial opportunism. I test this hypothesis 
empirically in the context of corporate merger and acquisition decisions from the perspective of 
stockholders of acquiring firms. I provide evidence that the probability of acquisition decisions in 
response to equity overpricing is significantly attenuated for firms with high-quality financial 
accounting information. The disciplining effect of the quality of public accounting information is 
driven by firms attempting to bid based on stock issuance. I also provide corroborating evidence by 
examining a similar disciplining role of high-quality accounting information in the seasoned public 
offering markets. 
Jensen (2005) argues that when stock prices are too high relative to fundamentals, 
managers are more likely to make poor takeover decisions when they run out of good 
investment projects. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) 
develop theoretical frameworks that explain managerial timing of market overvaluation of 
their firms. Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006) and Ang and Cheong (2006) find 
evidence consistent with this behavioral explanation for merger activity. 
2 
 
It has long been recognized in the literature that a divergence of interests exists 
between firm managers and stockholders where control over corporate economic resources is 
separated from outside stockholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Researchers, regulators, 
and practitioners have examined institutional arrangements that potentially mitigate this 
conflict and various factors that explain cross-sectional and time-series variation in these 
arrangements. Among the key determinants that affect the resolution of manager-stockholder 
conflict are corporate accounting and external reporting systems that produce a rich set of 
credible, objective firm-specific information which is verified by external audit process (Ball 
2001; Bushman and Smith 2001, 2003). High-quality accounting information facilities 
corporate governance by informing stockholders and by enabling directors to reduce agency 
costs by “advising, ratifying, and policing managerial decisions and activities (Bushman and 
Smith 2003, p. 68).” This paper focuses on the extent to which the quality of financial 
accounting information disciplines these divergent management interests in the setting of 
corporate acquisition and financing decisions. 
I propose a novel approach to testing the governance mechanism of financial 
accounting information when firm managers have private information that their stock price is 
overvalued (Myers and Majluf 1984). I argue that the main empirical challenge is to find 
firms whose observed equity prices are ex ante more likely to be overvalued relative to the 
fundamental values which are not directly observable.
1
 The overvaluation identifier I employ 
                                                          
1
 For example, traditional measures of equity overvaluation include firm characteristics such as market-to-book 
ratios and past stock price performance. These firm characteristics suffer from endogenous relations because 
both market-to-book ratios and past returns are also correlated with other important determinants of investment 
decisions such as growth opportunities, financing constraints, or managerial tendency to pursue personal 
objectives (Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler 2007). In addition, prior research on accounting disclosures shows that 
firms with high-quality accounting information enjoy lower cost of capital resulting in a correlation between 
metrics of financial reporting quality and various measures of the equity multiple or realized stock returns 
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is an external event, rather than a set of firm characteristics, which is also used in a growing 
body of literature on friction-driven mispricing events (see Duffie (2010) for a recent 
development in the literature). The overvaluation identification is made through the use of 
trading information of mutual funds that hold a portfolio of individual stocks, not through the 
trading information of individual stocks (Coval and Stafford 2007). Because I use a construct 
based on inferred mutual fund flows which are mechanically induced by fund level clientele 
needs, it is unlikely to be directly correlated with firm characteristics or reporting qualities of 
individual stocks. Specifically, mutual fund clientele shifts are unlikely to be caused by 
individual investor trading on private information about future timing of corporate 
investment policies. While it is possible investors could trade on this information in mutual 
funds, they could instead trade directly in the specific stock in the equity markets (Edmans, 
Jiang, and Goldstein 2012).
2
 
Prior studies also suggest that there is an important economic benefit associated with 
high-quality accounting information: an increased efficiency in a firm’s investment decisions 
(Bushman and Smith 2001, 2003).
3
 Unlike other studies focusing on components of 
corporate investments such as capital investment and R&D expenditure (Biddle and Hilary 
2006) or total investments based on an accounting-based framework (Richardson 2006; 
Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi 2008), I choose to focus on corporate mergers because they 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Botosan 1997; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 2005; Core, Guay, and Verdi 2008; Mashuwala and 
Mashuwala 2011). 
 
2
 I exclude mutual funds specializing in specific industries from my sample to eliminate the possibility that 
mutual fund flows are influenced by industry-wide movements in takeover activities such as M&A wave. 
 
3
 For example, Biddle and Hilary (2006) examine the effect of financial accounting quality on attenuating the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity as a measure of financing constraints. Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2008) show 
that high-quality financial accounting information reduces a firm’s likelihood of under or overinvesting, as 
captured by firm characteristics such as cash holdings and leverage ratios and by an expected level of 
investment model indicated by investment opportunities. 
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provide a powerful empirical setting for the purpose of testing the corporate governance 
impact of accounting quality. This setting offers a unique empirical platform for three 
reasons. First, corporate decisions about mergers and acquisitions have the potential for a 
wide divergence of incentives between managers and stockholders on economically 
significant transactions (Jensen 2005). Second, they tend to be relatively large and visible 
corporate investment decisions that usually attract media attention. Third, each merger and 
acquisition attempt has a clear-cut announcement date when the bidder discloses the intent 
for takeover. In turn, this provides a clear, observable time frame for change in market 
perception and operating performance caused by a particular type of management decision. 
To test the governance effect of financial reporting quality on opportunistic 
managerial merger and acquisition decisions, I use a sample of 3,909 attempted takeover bids 
made by U.S. public firms traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American 
Stock Exchange (Amex), or NASDAQ during the period 1990-2009 (obtained from 
Securities Data Company (SDC)). This study uses two key measures to test the governance 
effect. These measures are introduced here and discussed in detail in the measurement 
section later. First, following Coval and Stafford (2007), I create a quarterly measure of fund 
flow pressure for each stock held in common by mutual funds by using the mutual funds’ 
monthly total net assets and returns data (from CRSP Survivorship Bias-Free Mutual Fund) 
combined with the quarterly mutual fund holding data (from Thomson Financial Mutual 
Fund) over the period 1989-2008. The second measure is a proxy for financial accounting 
information quality. I use a measure of accruals quality in the spirit of Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) augmented by McNichols (2002) and Francis et al. (2005). In addition, I also employ 
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a measure of accounting quality used in McNichols and Stubben (2011), consistent with the 
direct cash flow forecasting model of Barth, Cram, and Nelson (2001). 
I first show that firms influenced by fund flow pressure are more likely than other 
firms to bid for acquisitions. This finding is consistent with the argument that firm managers 
are aware that equity price temporarily deviates from its fully-informed value and time the 
market to exploit the overpricing (Shleifer and Vishny 2003). Short window stock return tests 
surrounding the bid announcements show that acquisitions by fund flow pressure firms are 
significantly more value decreasing. Specifically, bidders with fund flow pressure 
incrementally lose 72 basis points in stock price over a 3-day window around the bid 
announcement relative to other bidders without such pressure. Using a methodology of 
Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) and Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), I document a 
subsequent abnormal decline in operating performance of 3 percent for bidders with fund 
flow pressure. This finding is consistent with the value destruction documented in the 
returns-based test. Overall, the preliminary empirical evidence supports assumptions of the 
behavioral and agency cost explanations of takeover decisions (Jensen 2005) and is 
inconsistent with the neoclassical view (Jovanovic and Rousseau 2002). 
In my primary test, I find that, after controlling for financing constraints, recent 
performance and payout policy, the tendency for firm managers to time the market is 
significantly attenuated for firms with high-quality financial accounting information. Further, 
I find that the disciplining effect of accounting information is mostly driven by firms that bid 
for acquisitions financed with stock issuance. I find no such effect for potential acquisitions 
financed through cash. My main findings are qualitatively similar after controlling for 
traditional measures of equity overpricing, such as market-to-book ratios and abnormal pre-
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announcement returns, and idiosyncratic risk (Panousi and Papanikolaou 2012). These 
findings are also robust to alternative estimates of accruals quality. The evidence suggests 
that high-quality accounting information allows stockholders to discipline firm managers that 
are motivated to take advantage of the temporary overpricing. Further, the findings suggest 
that the effectiveness of accounting information as a control mechanism is pronounced for 
firms that pursue more value-decreasing investment projects (Travlos 1987; Loughran and 
Vijh 1997; Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 2001; Stein 2003). I find similar results using a 
sample of seasoned public equity offerings. 
This study makes an important contribution to the extant literature on accounting 
information, corporate acquisition, and financing decisions. Specifically, the findings in the 
paper shed new light on the role of financial accounting information in ameliorating the 
manager-stockholder conflict concerning managerial corporate finance decisions by 
providing evidence on a direct underlying mechanism. This study makes a specific prediction 
about the impact of financial accounting quality on the core investment and financing 
policies using an ex ante approach. Then, the study highlights the mechanism through which 
the quality of financial accounting information is associated with an improvement in 
economic performance, namely from the effective monitoring over managerial short-term 
fixation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review 
and specific predictions. Section 3 presents and discusses measurement of proxies and 
Section 4 describes the sample. In section 5, I discuss the main empirical results and Section 
6 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review and Specific Predictions 
2.1 Agency Costs, Information, and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions 
When stockholders and corporate boards delegate the right to manage corporate 
resources to internal managers, a potential divergence in interests between managers and 
stockholders exists because of likely information asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 
Jensen and Ruback 1983). According to Jensen (2005), high equity valuation increases 
managerial discretion concerning corporate investment policies and makes it possible for 
managers to pursue bad acquisitions if stockholders imperfectly monitor and control the 
investment decisions. These investments are likely to be value-destroying (i.e., negative net 
present value projects) because they are driven by management desire to diversify the risk of 
their own investment portfolios, or to pursue other forms of personal benefits such as empire 
building. Managers also attempt to boost and maintain the inflated stock prices persistently 
and meet the growth expectations embedded in the prices by making successive suboptimal 
investment decisions. Moreover, availability of excess cash generated from the equity 
issuance when the stock is overpriced creates an agency problem of free cash flows similar to 
that in Jensen (1986). Namely, this excess cash creates conflict in determining optimal size 
and payout.  
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) put forth 
models under which managers time merger activity in response to high stock market 
valuation. Both papers rely in part on the assumptions that managers of acquiring firms have 
private information that their stocks are overpriced relative to fundamental values, and that 
they wish to take advantage of the temporary mispricing. Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and 
Teoh (2006) and Ang and Cheong (2006) use an accounting-based valuation framework to 
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estimate fundamental values and provide evidence suggesting that there is a positive 
correlation between value-to-book ratios and acquisition attempts, especially for those 
contemporaneously financed though stock issuance. Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and 
Viswanathan (2005) use a regression-based approach to decompose market-to-book ratios 
and similarly conclude that managerial timing of stock overvaluation explains the positive 
correlation between probability of merger bids and high valuation. In sum, studies of 
corporate takeover activities based on behavioral approaches collectively deliver 
explanations that have both intuitive appeal and substantial support in the data. 
However, another viewpoint, the neoclassical perspective, motivates the same 
empirical pattern, but maintains the assumptions of efficient markets. The neoclassical 
perspective asserts that the positive relation between merger activity and high valuation 
exists because the acquisitions are beneficial for stockholders, leading to reallocation of 
assets among firms to the users with the highest value. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) 
provide a q-theory approach to merger and acquisition investment and argue that a firm’s 
response to the q–ratio is stronger for investment related to takeover activities than for capital 
investment. Further, research drawing the neoclassical perspective suggests that firms are 
more likely to issue equity when they are highly valued because of benefits relating to 
flexibility in capital structures.
4
 Thus, findings that corporate acquisition attempts are 
positively linked with abnormally high market valuation during a period leading up to the bid 
announcement is consistent not only with the behavioral explanations for managerial market 
timing incentives, but also with the neoclassical explanations. The results I present are 
                                                          
4
 This effect, however, will be observed only for firms that have a profitable investment opportunity set, but 
face the binding financing constraints (Lamont and Stein 2006; Bakke and Whited 2010). 
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consistent with the agency view of the correlation between high stock value and merger 
activity. 
As pointed out in Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2007), the use of traditional measures 
of equity overvaluation such as high market-to-book ratios and high past abnormal returns is 
still controversial because these firm characteristics suffer from measurement error issues 
and endogenous relations with other important determinants of corporate investment and 
financing policies. Specifically, the market-to-book ratio is a ratio of market value of equity 
to fundamental value that is represented by accounting book value of equity. However, the 
reported book value of equity is affected by both historical cost accounting and 
(opportunistic) managerial discretionary accounting choices that may distort the description 
of true value of fundamentals.  Moreover, the market-to-book ratio is a firm characteristic 
that, as prior research suggests, is correlated with distress costs, growth opportunities, 
financing constraints, or capital market incentives of managers. In a similar way, an 
accumulation of abnormal stock returns in a pre-merger period may not be a valid measure of 
stock overvaluation if the return represents future investment opportunities that are not 
reflected in accounting amounts. The research design I employ addresses the identification 
and measurement issues in prior research by using a mutual fund level (versus firm level) 
measure. This measure is discussed in detail in the measurement section of the paper.  
2.2 The Governance Role of Accounting Information and Accrual Accounting 
Prior research has extensively investigated various corporate governance factors that 
mitigate the potential manager-stockholder conflict in firms whose equity stake is diffusely 
held by investors. Among the key components of governance mechanisms are corporate 
financial accounting systems that provide a broad set of reliable firm-specific information 
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which is prepared according to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and 
verified by the external audit regime. Even highly developed securities markets such as the 
U.S. capital markets devote extensive resources to design, implement, and maintain a 
credible financial reporting system that routinely provides audited quantitative data, 
reflecting a firm’s financial position and operating performance (Bushman and Smith 2003). 
Specifically, financial accounting information serves this important governance function in 
two key ways. First, the information provides timely feedback about the fundamental value 
of investments to suppliers of capital and protects them from the risk of potential 
expropriation by corporate managers and insiders. Second, it offers a basis for stockholders 
and directors to exert pressure on management resource allocation decisions. 
Although a firm’s business operation itself is continuous, financial accounting system 
reports financial performance during fixed, periodic intervals dictated by accounting fiscal 
periods (i.e., annual, semiannual, or quarterly). In this case, cash flows for a given interval 
may introduce noise in assessing long-term values of corporations because cash receipts and 
disbursements do not necessarily occur in accordance with the timing of economic 
transactions and events (Dechow 1994). To adjust for the timing and matching problems, 
accrual accounting provides managers with accounting discretion in applying accounting 
principles when they recognize revenues and associated expenses. As a result, discretion 
allowed in reporting performance measures can facilitate timely incorporation of future 
economic events and, in turn, increase firm transparency. 
Although accounting discretion was originally implemented to allow managers to 
more truthfully represent firm economic fundamentals over time, there is also a possibility 
that discretion is used by managers for opportunistic reasons (Dechow and Skinner 2000). In 
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fact, prior literature on corporate takeovers provides evidence of income-increasing earnings 
management on or just before making acquisition attempts and that the post-acquisition 
market and accounting performance results can be explained by reversals of the pre-
announcement earnings management (e.g., Erickson and Wang 1999; Louis 2004; Gong, 
Louis, and Sun 2008). Other studies on accounting manipulations around corporate seasoned 
public offering practices show that firms offering seasoned securities conduct earnings 
management in the period before the event to overstate pre-issue stock prices (e.g., Teoh, 
Welch, and Wong 1998; Rangan 1998; Shivakumar 2000; Cohen and Zarowin 2010). 
Evidence of accounting manipulations associated with capital market motives around 
these important economic events is well-established in the literature, but my paper differs in 
three important ways. First, my objective is to demonstrate the role of financial accounting 
quality in attenuating managerial market timing of corporate acquisition and financing 
policies, whereas prior studies focus on the role of earnings manipulations in accounting as 
well as return performance implications before, during, and after the events. Second, my 
paper adopts an ex ante approach and investigates whether the quality of financial accounting 
information plays a fundamental corporate governance role when there is an external shock 
caused by mutual fund flow pressure, whereas prior studies rely on an ex post approach and 
examine whether firm managers exercise discretion in producing accounting numbers for an 
event sample of completed acquisition deals and of seasoned equity issuers, respectively. 
Third, my measure of accounting information quality differs in that it is constructed over a 
rolling-window ending at least two years before the event and is predetermined at the time of 
and around the economic events, whereas prior studies estimate accounting earnings 
manipulations over two to four quarters just before and after the event.  
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There are several recent papers that consider accounting quality and corporate 
takeovers. Specifically, McNichols and Stubben (2011) and Raman, Shivakumar, and 
Tamayo (2008) employ a measure of accruals quality and find that high-quality financial 
reporting of target firms reduces uncertainty about valuation of targets in the corporate 
takeover market. These studies examine effects of the target’s accounting information quality 
on return premium to both the acquiring and the target firms (McNichols and Stubben 2011) 
and on various merger-related decisions, including incidence of renegotiation, payment 
methods, and premium to target firm shareholders (Raman, Shivakumar, and Tamayo 2008). 
While these papers are directly related to corporate takeover which is the setting for my 
paper, my study differs from these papers on three key points. First, my paper focuses on the 
quality of financial accounting information of acquiring firms rather than that of target firms. 
Second, my paper studies the market timing of acquisition deals rather than the premium. 
Third, my study includes additional comprehensive analysis of incorporating both investment 
and financing decisions conditional on equity overpricing.
5
  
2.3 Empirical Predictions 
Recent developments in the literature on friction-based equity mispricing associated 
with mutual fund excess liquidity open up the possibility for future research to examine the 
market timing effect of stock overvaluation on corporate takeover and financing decisions 
(Duffie 2010). Following Coval and Stafford (2007), I use trading information of mutual 
                                                          
5
 A recent paper by Lee and Masulis (2009) examines whether accruals quality of seasoned equity offering 
firms is associated with flotation costs such as underwriting fees, announcement effects and probability of 
withdrawals. Similar to Lee and Masulis (2009), I find that accruals quality of issuing firms plays an important 
role in the public offering markets. However, this paper differs in the following ways. First, my paper 
approaches the study of accruals from a corporate governance perspective, whereas Lee and Masulis (2009) use 
the accruals quality as a proxy for determinants of the flotation costs. Second, I examine the role of accruals 
quality in the market timing hypothesis when stock price is overvalued rather than in determining the flotation 
costs when firms issue seasoned equity. 
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funds that hold a portfolio of individual stocks rather than trading information of individual 
stocks. Thus, my equity overvaluation identifier is an external shock to individual firms 
rather than direct reflections of firm characteristics. 
By focusing on the behavior of mutual funds, I examine funds that are influenced by 
extreme liquidity in their fund flows. Fund managers are then more likely to expand their 
current holdings of individual stocks in order to immediately respond to demand shifts in 
clientele needs. Specifically, by combining information about stock holdings maintained by 
mutual fund managers at the beginning of each quarter with the transaction data of those 
funds concerning investment returns and total net asset changes during the quarter, I identify 
firms whose stock prices are ex ante more likely to be overvalued. This approach turns out to 
be very successful in predicting initial price movements in the direction of extreme fund 
flows, which is followed by a subsequent stock price reversal which may take several 
quarters (Coval and Stafford 2007). 
Agency theory proposed in Jensen (2005) predicts that, when a firm’s equity price 
deviates from fully-informed value because of non-fundamental reasons, management 
decisions on corporate investment and financing are more likely determined by opportunistic 
motives. The long-term value destruction from managerial self-interested behavior occurs 
when relevant information concerning a firm’s business prospects is asymmetrically 
distributed between managers and stockholders, and the outcome of monitoring from 
stockholders is less than perfect under the existing securities laws.
6
 I argue that financial 
accounting systems, which facilitate incorporation of changes in firm-specific economic 
                                                          
6
 It is also consistent with active investors lacking incentives to undertake costly monitoring because of free-
rider problems. 
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fundamentals, enhance stockholders’ ability to discipline managers in investment and 
financing decisions. Specifically, my first prediction is: 
P1: High-quality financial accounting information reduces the probability of 
takeover bids by firms whose stock prices are ex ante more likely to be overpriced 
relative to fundamental values, as captured by mutual fund flow pressure.  
 
To directly implement an empirical test of the Jensen (2005) hypothesis, I isolate a 
setting where the economic interests between managers and stockholders are likely to 
diverge, and thus, the role of financial accounting information in the governance process is 
more likely to come into play. A number of prior empirical studies provide evidence that 
stock-financed acquisitions are typically more value-decreasing (Stein 2003). Furthermore, 
behavioral theories on corporate acquisitions predict that managers are more likely to bid 
stock-financed acquisitions in comparison to cash-financed acquisitions when the degree of 
overvaluation of bidding firms increases (Shleifer and Vishny 2003). Thus, my second 
prediction is: 
P2: The disciplining role of publicly reported financial accounting information in 
takeover markets is stronger or largely driven by acquisition attempts being financed 
with stock issuance.  
 
Finally, as illustrated in section 2.2, accounting discretion is a double-edged sword 
(Dechow and Skinner 2000). On the one hand, it increases corporate transparency by 
reducing timing and matching problems embedded in cash flow realizations in a finite period. 
On the other hand, if it is abused by managers, it decreases credibility of financial accounting 
information, and misguide investors. That is, the quality of financial accounting information 
is also affected by management incentive to manage final accounting outcomes for 
opportunistic reasons. In addition, unintentional errors related to inherent difficulty in 
estimating accruals for firms characterized by volatile operating environments can deteriorate 
15 
 
the quality of financial accounting. I do not dismiss any of these possibilities suggested in the 
existing literature. Specifically, in a supplemental analysis, I show that inferences drawn in 
this paper are robust to inclusion of balance sheet overstatement as reflections of an 
accumulation of prior period income-increasing earnings management (Barton and Simko 
2002). Furthermore, my inferences are insensitive to controls for difficulty and complexity 
embedded in accrual estimation process (McNichols 2002).
7
 
3. Measurement 
3.1 Measures of Mutual Fund Flow Pressure  
I collect trading information of mutual funds from the intersection of two databases. 
First, I begin with the Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holding Database where information 
on quarterly mutual fund holding position is available. Specifically, mutual funds’ purchases 
and sales of individual stocks are inferred from the change in holdings for each stock over the 
two consecutive quarters. I exclude trades by index, international, municipal bond funds, 
funds primarily investing bonds and preferred stocks, and sector funds from the analysis in 
order to focus on the behavior of the actively managed, diversified, domestic U.S. mutual 
fund population (Coval and Stafford 2007). Next, I combine the holding data from Thomson 
Reuters with the monthly total net asset and return data from the CRSP Survivorship Bias-
Free Mutual Fund Database. Following the recommendations of prior research (Ali, Wei, and 
Zhou 2011), I use a link table “MFLINKS” provided by the Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS) to merge these two databases.  
                                                          
7
 The inference relating to the governance role of accounting information quality in corporate decisions is 
potentially limited if: (1) accounting information is mainly a set of backward looking and arbitrary information 
irrelevant for merger decisions (Bruner 2004, p. 248); and (2) there are sufficient amounts of competing 
information sources such as analyst reports and press releases that may preempt periodic accounting reports 
(Francis and Schipper 1999; Francis, Schipper, and Vincent 2002). 
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For each stock traded by mutual funds, a measure of mutual fund flow pressure is 
constructed according to the following two-step procedure. First, mutual fund flows are 
calculated as a percentage of beginning-of-period total net assets. Specifically, realized 
mutual fund flows are measured as the percentage change in total net assets over the calendar 
month period after taking into account capital gains and losses of the initial holdings. The 
monthly net flow of mutual fund j in month m is defined as follows.  
            
                       
       
                                                                       (1) 
where TNAj,m is the total net assets of fund j at the end of month m, and Rj,m is the return of 
fund j at month m. Then, the monthly net flows, Fund Flowj,m, are aggregated into the 
quarterly net fund flows, Fund Flowj,q, for fund j in quarter q to be matched with the 
quarterly holding data. 
Second, the trading pressure metric for stock i in quarter q is calculated as follows: 
                                                                        
                                                                                       (2)  
where ∆Holdingj,i,q is the quarterly change in fund j’s position of stock i at quarter q, 90
th
 Pctl 
(10
th
 Pctl) is the 90
th
 (10
th
) percentile of Fund Flowj,q across the total mutual fund population, 
and Shrouti,q-1 is the number of common shares outstanding for stock i at the end of quarter q-
1. Intuitively, Fund Flow Pressurei,q is a stock-level summary construct that measures the 
extent of quarterly price impact that is associated with excess demand from mutual funds 
with extreme capital flows.  
An important feature of my measure of overvalued equity is that it is not constructed 
using any of the firm-specific characteristics or actual stock returns, but instead uses inferred 
mutual fund trades mechanically induced by shifts in clientele demand. Specifically, mutual 
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funds face both restricted investment opportunity sets and diminishing marginal rate of 
returns from their investment (Khan, Kogan, and Serafeim 2012). These factors lead to 
substantial excess fund flows being channeled into a selected set of stocks that are held by 
these funds. I provide relevant statistics in support of this explanation in Section 4.2. 
Moreover, these fund flows are unlikely to be directly driven by investors’ implicit prospects 
with respect to future timing of corporate acquisition and financing activities. Investors can 
always speculate on their views by directly trading common shares of individual firms, rather 
than indirectly trade mutual funds’ shares (Edmans, Jiang, and Goldstein 2012). 
3.2 Measures of the Quality of Financial Accounting Information 
The measure of accounting quality employed in this paper is consistent with the 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. This measure is based on a relation between current-
period working capital accruals and operating cash flows in the previous-, current-, and next-
period.
8
 The measure summarizes the extent accruals relate to past, current, and future cash 
flows, based on the notion that accruals are estimates of future cash flows realizations and 
accounting earnings are better predictors of future cash flows when there is a lower 
estimation error in the accrual process. Therefore, the extent to which accruals do not map 
into cash flows in the adjacent periods is an inverse measure of the quality of reported 
accounting numbers. 
                                                          
8
 Francis et al. (2004) characterize various proxies of accounting quality as either “accounting-based” or 
“market-based” and refer to the accruals quality metric from Dechow and Dichev (2002) as “accounting-based.” 
Because the accruals quality takes the cash flow itself as a benchmark construct and employs accounting data 
only, I assume that the primary function of accounting earnings is to efficiently allocate cash flows over 
multiple reporting periods through the accruals estimation process. “Market-based” earnings attributes (e.g., 
value relevance or timely loss recognition), however, rely on the assumption that the main function of 
accounting system is to reflect economic earnings embedded in realized stock price changes, which may 
confound the inferences related to the impact of accounting quality on misvaluation-driven corporate 
investment and financing activities. 
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Specifically, Dechow and Dichev (2002) model an estimation error in anticipating 
future cash flow realizations by focusing on working capital accruals. They conceptualize 
cash flow realization (i.e., net of cash receipts and cash disbursements) in period t as the sum 
of three distinct components: cash flows realized in period t and accrued at period t-1 (CFt
t-1
), 
cash flows realized and recognized in period t (CFt
t
), and cash flows realized in period t and 
deferred to period t+1 (CFt
t+1
).
9
 Thus, cash flows realized in period t is represented as 
follows. 
CFt = CFt
t-1
 + CFt
t  
+ CFt
t+1   
                                                                                                    (3) 
Similarly, accounting accruals recognized in period t (ACC
t
) can be modeled as 
follows. 
ACC
t
 = CFt-1
t
 - (CFt
t-1
 + CFt
t+1
) + CFt+1
t
 + et+1
t
 + et
t-1
                                                             (4) 
That is, the amount of accruals recognized in period t (ACC
t
) is the cash flows 
realized in period t-1 and deferred to period t (CFt-1
t
), minus the cash flows realized in period 
t and accrued at period t-1 (CFt
t-1
), minus the cash flows realized in period t and deferred to 
period t+1 (CFt
t+1
), plus the cash flows realized in period t+1 and accrued at period t (CFt+1
t
), 
plus two accrual estimation error terms. The first error term refers to the estimation error 
realized in period t+1 associated with accruals recognized in period t (et+1
t
), and the second 
term refers the estimation error realized in t resulting from accruals recognized in period t-1 
(et
t-1
). These estimation errors exist whenever there is a difference between the amounts 
recognized and the amounts realized in a subsequent period. Thus, earnings or the accrual 
component of earnings in any period contain the opening error that will be realized in the 
next period and the closing error which is realized in the current period. The extent to which 
                                                          
9
 The subscripts refer to the period the cash receipts or cash disbursements are made, and the superscripts refer 
to the period the cash flows are recognized in the accrual system. 
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realized amounts (i.e., cash flows) differ from already recognized amounts (i.e., accruals) is 
an inverse measure of the precision in the accrual process. 
Following McNichols (2002), I implement the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, 
augmenting it with the inclusion of two fundamental descriptors of business models 
originally used in Jones (1991): the year-to-year change in revenue and the gross property, 
plant, and equipment.  
                                                                            (5) 
where ACCi,t is the working capital accruals for firm i in year t, CFi,t is the cash flow from 
operations for firm i in year t,  ∆Salesi,t is the change in sales revenue (COMPUSTAT item 
SALE) for firm i from year t–1 to t, and PPEi,t is the gross property, plant, and equipment 
(COMPUSTAT item PPEGT) for firm i in year t. ACC is defined as the change in current 
assets (COMPUSTAT item ACT), minus current liabilities (COMPUSTAT item LCT), minus 
the change in cash and short-term investments (COMPUSTAT item CHE), plus the change in 
debt in current liabilities (COMPUSTAT item DLC). CF is calculated as the net income 
before extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT item IB) minus the total accruals (TACC).
10
 All 
regression variables are deflated by the average total assets (COMPUSTAT item AT). 
Following Francis et al. (2005), I estimate the accruals quality of Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) based on a yearly cross-section of firms partitioned by Fama and French (1997) 48 
industry classification, requiring a minimum of twenty observations in each industry-year 
pair. The accruals quality, AQ_DD, is the standard deviation of firm-level residuals from the 
cross-sectional estimation of Dechow and Dichev (2002) model over a five-year rolling 
                                                          
10
 Total accruals (TACC) are defined as the change in current assets (COMPUSTAT item ACT), minus current 
liabilities (COMPUSTAT item LCT), minus the change in cash and short-term investments (COMPUSTAT 
item CHE), plus the change in debt in current liabilities (COMPUSTAT item DLC), minus the depreciation and 
amortization expense (COMPUSTAT item DP). 
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window and multiplied by negative one. To avoid the look-ahead bias caused by the use of 
future period’s operating cash flows, the accruals quality for firm i in quarter q is estimated 
over the fiscal year period from t-5 to t-1 leading up to the end of quarter q-4.   
I also employ a measure of accruals quality used in McNichols and Stubben (2011) 
based on the presumption that accounting information helps predict future cash flows and is 
directly useful for equity valuation purposes (Barth, Cram, and Nelson, 2001). 
                                                                                                             (6) 
where TACCi,t is the total accruals for firm i in year t, and CFi,t is the cash flow from 
operations for firm i in year t. All regression variables are deflated by the average total assets. 
Similar to McNichols and Stubben (2011), I estimate the above equation each year for 
a cross-section of firms designated by Fama and French (1997) 48 industry classification, 
requiring at least twenty observations in each cross-section. The accruals quality, AQ_CF, is 
the standard deviation of firm-level residuals from the one-year-out cash flow forecasting 
model using a five-year rolling window from year t-4 to year t leading up to the end of 
quarter q–4 and multiplied by negative one. 
4. Sample and Descriptive Evidence 
4.1 Sample Criteria 
I collect my sample from several data sources. I obtain daily as well as monthly stock 
returns and price data from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), financial 
statement data necessary for the calculation of accruals quality and other determinants of the 
timing of corporate decisions from both the annual and quarterly COMPUSTAT databases, 
mutual fund holding (trading) and return data from the intersection of the Thomson Reuters 
and the CRSP Survivorship Bias-Free Mutual Fund Databases, and corporate acquisition bids 
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and seasoned equity offerings data from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. In 
supplemental tests, I also use block institutional ownership data from the Thomas Financial 
Institutional Holdings (13F) database, insider ownership data from the Thomson Financial 
Insider (Forms 3, 4 and 5) database, and analyst following data from Institutional Brokers 
Estimates System (I/B/E/S). 
Specifically, my sample includes all mergers and acquisitions announced during the 
period January 1, 1990-December 31, 2009, as recorded in the SDC Platinum Merger & 
Acquisition database. I select acquisition bids made by U.S. public firms that are listed in the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (Amex), or NASDAQ. 
Following prior research, I collect acquisition deals which meet the following selection 
criteria: (1) the ownership percentage sought by an acquirer is above 50 percent to ensure 
that the deal involves the majority shares of target company, (2) the deal is financed through 
either pure stock or pure cash, (3) the deal’s transaction value is greater than $1 million; and 
(4) the attempted bids are completed or withdrawn subsequently.
11
 I also construct a sample 
of seasoned equity offerings after requiring events to be primary or secondary common stock 
offerings made by U.S. public firms. I exclude units and warrants offerings. 
The total event and non-event samples consist of an unbalanced panel of quarterly 
COMPUSTAT firms over the period from January 1990 to December 2009. Following 
Eckbo and Masulis (1992) and Chen, Jiang, and Goldstein (2007), I exclude observations that 
belong to financial industries (SIC code 6000-6999) and utilities industries (SIC code 4200) 
because of the difference in institutional and regulatory environments. My final sample 
                                                          
11
 Using only completed acquisition bids potentially introduces a bias in my tests of the control mechanisms 
performed by publicly reported financial accounting information on mergers. This relates to when distributional 
characteristics of completed/withdrawn bids are systematically associated with the quality of financial 
accounting information and/or the presence of mutual fund flow pressure. I discuss this issue in more detail in 
Section 5.4.2. 
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consists of 215,959 firm-quarter observations with 7,582 distinct firms, 3,909 attempted 
merger and acquisition bids (1,143 stock-financed and 2,766 cash-financed offers), and 1,905 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).  
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
When mutual funds are being influenced by excess inflows from the clientele demand 
shifts, fund managers are challenged to quickly find profitable investment opportunities to 
outperform their peers (Coval and Stafford 2007). Moreover, because these fund managers 
follow specialized investment strategies, mutual funds are less likely to invest excess fund 
flows in a wide universe of stocks such as an index portfolio.  In addition, as illustrated in 
Khan, Kogan, and Serafeim (2012), mutual funds are likely to face (1) restricted investment 
opportunity sets and (2) diminishing marginal rate of returns from investment, both of which 
contribute to a substantial excess fund flow being channeled into a restricted set of stocks. 
Therefore, stocks held by mutual funds with extreme capital inflows are ex ante more likely 
to be affected by a temporary price pressure.  
Panels A and B of Table 1 present summary descriptive statistics of the U.S. mutual 
funds over the period 1989-2008. The statistics include the average fund positions as well as 
fund returns across decile portfolios of fund-quarter observations based on the sign and 
magnitude of fund capital flows. Panel A of Table 1 shows that the average number of stocks 
held by mutual funds designated in the top flow decile is 95, which is smaller than the 
average stock holdings of all mutual funds within my sample period. In Panel B, the 
percentage of stock holdings that are expanded relative to the beginning holdings of stocks is 
strongly, positively associated with the ranking of quarterly mutual fund flows. Specifically, 
mutual funds ranked as the top decile of capital flows expand more than 50 percent of the 
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beginning-of-period positions, whereas mutual funds ranked as the bottom decile expand 
only 14 percent of the beginning-of-quarter holdings.  
While the percentage of expansion is monotonically increasing with the rank of 
quarterly fund flows, the percentage of stock positions reduced relative to the beginning 
positions is monotonically decreasing with the ranks of fund flows. The top flow decile funds 
reduce only 9 percent of the beginning positions, but the bottom flow decile funds reduce 
more than 40 percent of the current stock holdings. These results are consistent with an 
explanation that mutual fund managers face both restricted investment opportunity sets and 
the diminishing marginal investment prospects. Overall, the tendency of mutual funds to 
expand as well as to reduce the current stock holdings in response to extreme capital inflows 
is broadly consistent with the pattern of mutual fund purchasing and selling behavior 
documented in Coval and Stafford (2007) and Ali, Wei, and Zhou (2011).  
Table 2 shows summary statistics on firm characteristics and bid-specific 
characteristics. In Panel A of Table 2, I present sample descriptive statistics of the two 
measures of accruals quality and selected firm characteristics that are expected to be 
associated with corporate acquisition decisions such as financing constraints, recent 
performance and growth, and payout policy. The average Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
accruals quality and the average accruals quality metric based on the one-year ahead cash 
flow forecasting model are both negative (-0.05 and -0.11, respectively), which are consistent 
with the statistics reported in prior literature (Francis et al. 2005).  
This paper considers several firm characteristic variables as proxies for financial 
flexibility and/or financing constraints. Excess cash is constructed using a quarterly model of 
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normal cash holding adapted from Harford (1999).
12
 I take the regression residuals from the 
model as a proxy that represents how financially flexible is the firm. As proxies for financing 
constraints, I include leverage, firm age, and size. After a careful text examination of annual 
reports, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) conclude that firm age and size parsimoniously capture 
financial situations public firms actually face.   
Because internally generated cash flows from recent performance and growth are 
expected to affect the likelihood of corporate takeover decisions, I include ROA, asset 
growth, and sales growth. Moreover, the agency theory discussed in Jensen (1986) predicts 
that managers are more likely to conduct myopic corporate investment and financing 
activities to sustain recent growth reflected in assets and sales. 
Approximately 36 percent of the firms in my sample pay quarterly cash dividends 
(Skinner and Soltes 2011).  Following the specification of Fama and French (2000), I include 
both an indicator variable, which is set to one if a firm pays cash dividends and zero 
otherwise, and the quarterly dividend deflated by book value of equity. I use two proxies for 
stock valuation and/or investment opportunities. First, I use the conventional market-to-book 
ratio, which is measured as a ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity at the 
end of quarter q-4. In addition, I include abnormal pre-bid announcement stock price 
                                                          
12
 Specifically, I estimate the following regression model each year to construct a quarterly version of excess 
cash variable. The mean yearly adjusted R
2 
in my sample from 1990 to 2009 is 14.9 percent (not tabulated). 
                                                                                       
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              (A1) 
where Cashi,q-4 is the cash and short-term investments deflated by total assets for firm i in quarter q-4, CFi,q-4 is 
the quarterly operating cash flow deflated by total assets for firm i in quarter q-4, ∆CFi,q-4 is the change in 
quarterly operating cash flows deflated by total assets for firm i from quarter q–8 to q-4, Mkt-to-Booki,t-8 is the 
ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity for firm i at the end of quarter q-8, Cash Flow Voli,q-4 is 
the standard deviation of seasonal changes in quarterly operating cash flows deflated by total assets, over the 
twenty-quarter rolling window, for firm i at the end of quarter q-4, MVi,q-8 is the natural logarithm of market 
value of equity for firm i at the end of quarter q-8, and Q2i,q-4 (Q3i,q-4) [Q4i,q-4] is an indicator variable that is 
equal to one if the dependant variable belongs to the second (third) [fourth] fiscal quarter, and zero otherwise, 
for firm i in quarter q-4. 
 
25 
 
performance, which is calculated as a cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return over the 
twelve-month period leading up to the end of quarter q-1. Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012) 
argue that idiosyncratic risk prevents managers from investing in a positive net present value 
(NPV) project as a consequence on managerial risk aversion. For this reason, I include 
variables that represent both idiosyncratic and systematic return volatilities. 
To capture a balance sheet overstatement potentially caused by prior period income-
increasing earnings management, I include net operating assets, divided by sales over the 
trailing four quarter period at the end of quarter q-4. As a proxy for inherent difficulty in 
accrual estimation process, I incorporate four proxies that are indicative of 
complexity/volatility of a firm’s operating environments. Prior studies use the volatility of 
sales and cash flows, the frequency of losses, and the length of operating cycles to describe 
the innate determinants of accruals quality (Dechow and Dichev 2002; McNichols 2002).
13
  
In Panel B of Table 2, I show summary statistics on deal-specific characteristics and 
additional factors affecting a method of financing a proposed transaction. Number of bids is 
calculated as the total number of bidders for the same target over the period beginning 180-
days prior to the bid announcement and ending 180-days subsequent to the announcement 
date. Presence of multiple bidders may indicate that the proposed transaction is value-
increasing and/or an excess premium paid by the first bidder (Harford 1999).  The average 
natural logarithm of deal value, which is a proxy for economic significance of proposed 
merger and acquisition attempts, is 4.03. Diversifying is an indicator variable which is set to 
one if a bid relates to a target outside the bidder’s industry classification, represented by 2-
                                                          
13
 Consistent with the finding in Francis et al. (2005), the average yearly adjusted R
2
 from a regression of 
accruals quality on the estimated five innate factors (including firm size) in my sample over the period 1990-
2009 is 41 percent (not tabulated). The results suggest that these factors explain a large portion of cross-
sectional variation in accruals quality. 
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digit SIC figures. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) show that diversifying mergers are 
more likely to be determined by managerial personal objectives and are likely to be value 
destroying.  
Because stock-financed acquisitions involve both investment and stock issuance 
decisions, stock owners with significant shares prefer cash-based acquisitions. For this 
reason, I include percentage of shares held by block holders and insiders, separately, over the 
trailing four quarter period leading up to the end of quarter q-4. However, in many cases, 
firms bidding for cash-financed acquisitions need additional capital because the proposed 
deal value normally exceeds the cash reserves available. Thus, cash-financed acquisitions 
usually involve issuing debt (Martin 1996; Faccio and Masulis 2005). To capture factors 
determining debt versus equity financing decisions relating to takeover deals, I use excess 
cash, leverage, firm age, and size as proxies for financing constraints. Finally, a tax benefit 
associated with debt financing may incrementally affect the method of financing in 
acquisitions. I incorporate a proxy for marginal tax rates, which is estimated for firm i in the 
most recent fiscal year relative to the end of quarter q-4 following the bin approach proposed 
by Blouin, Core, and Guay (2010).   
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Firms with Fund Flow Pressure and the Likelihood of a Bid  
To establish a link between equity overpricing represented by fund flow pressure and 
acquisition decisions, I use a sample of attempted mergers and acquisitions financed through 
either pure stock or pure cash from January 1990 to December 2009. Based on the 
methodology of Harford (1999), I estimate a Logit equation to predict which firms become 
takeover bidders. Harford’s (1999) model takes into account a fairly comprehensive set of 
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acquisition determinants suggested by the prior literature. Because I focus on the market 
timing hypothesis, I estimate a quarterly version of acquisition prediction while including 
additional control variables concerning managerial investment decisions in general. I add an 
indicator variable, FFP, which is set to one if firm-quarters are located in the top decile of 
Fund Flow Pressurei,q in any of the four quarters (i.e., quarter q-4 to q-1) prior to the event 
quarter q, and zero otherwise (see Section 3.1. for details). The Logit estimation employs all 
firms in COMPUSTAT for which necessary data are available. The dependant variable in the 
model, M&A, is set to one if the firm makes a bid announcement (regardless of financing 
methods) in quarter q and zero otherwise. The remaining variables are defined in Appendix. I 
include industry and year fixed effects in all regression models and cluster heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors at the firm level (Peterson 2009). 
The results of the Logit estimations are presented in Table 3. The data requirements 
leave 215,959 firm-quarter observations and 3,909 takeover attempts made by public firms. 
As predicted by agency theory of overvaluation proposed by Jensen (2005), the probability of 
becoming a bidder increases with the presence of fund flow pressure. Specifically, firms 
which are influenced by mutual fund flow pressure are 0.38 percent more likely to become 
bidders than other firms. This is both statistically and economically significant given the 
unconditional probability of being a bidder is only 1.81 percent in my sample. More 
important, this result shows that in predicting merger activity, the effect of fund flow 
pressure is not simply a proxy for financing constraints, recent performance and growth, or 
payout policy. Note also that cash-rich, less levered, younger, and large firms are more likely 
to make acquisition bids. In addition, firms with higher operating performance and recent 
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growth in total assets and sales, and firms who do not pay dividends are more likely to 
become bidders. 
The finding that the likelihood of being a bidder is increasing in mutual fund flow 
pressure is also consistent with Dong et al. (2006), Ang and Cheng (2006), and Rhodes-
Kropf et al. (2005) who find that there is a positive correlation between merger decisions and 
high valuation using alternative approaches to capture equity overvaluation. The results 
presented in Columns (2) to (4) lend further support to the interpretation that the probability 
of bidding for acquisitions is incrementally increasing in fund flow pressure after controlling 
for market-to-book ratios and prior stock price performance. This result is also robust to 
controls including idiosyncratic and systematic risk proxies.   
 In this subsection, I establish that managers are more likely to bid for mergers and 
acquisitions when the stock price is ex ante more likely to be overstated, captured by fund 
flow pressure. However, whether these takeover attempts are actually value-decreasing 
cannot be directly inferred from the above probability analysis. To quantify the consequence 
of bidding decisions driven by market timing motives, the next subsection examines the stock 
price reaction to bid announcements and the ex post changes in operating performance.  
5.2. Announcement Returns and Operating Performance for Bidders with Fund Flow 
Pressure 
I focus on corporate merger and acquisition decisions because they are large and 
observable investment decisions that routinely attract media attention. Moreover, the 
takeover decision is publicly available on a bid announcement date around which I can 
directly observe market reactions. I estimate OLS regressions with the announcement-period 
abnormal returns for a bidding firm as the dependent variable. I use a three-day window 
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centered on the bid announcement. I use both market-adjusted returns based on the CRSP 
value-weighted market index and size-adjusted returns based on the CRSP size-matched 
portfolio returns. The first independent variable is FFP, which again represents the presence 
of fund flow pressure. The other independent variables are drawn from the prior literature on 
acquisition decisions: an indicator variable for stock-financed deals, number of other bidders, 
transaction value, and an indicator variable representing whether a proposed bid is for 
diversifying acquisitions or not. Similar to the Logit estimation, I include industry and year 
fixed effects in all regression specifications and cluster heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
errors at the firm level (Peterson 2009). 
The estimation results based on an OLS regression are shown in Table 4. The 
coefficient on the presence of fund flow pressure is consistently significantly negative in all 
four specifications, insensitive to the inclusion of control variables that capture deal-specific 
characteristics and to the use of alternative benchmark returns. This supports the agency costs 
hypothesis in Jensen (2005) that managers of overvalued firms tend to make worse 
acquisitions than other firms because of their increased discretion over investment decisions. 
The acquisition bids made by fund flow pressure firms are associated with an abnormal stock 
price reaction that is lower by 55-74 basis points than the acquisition bids made by firms 
without such pressure.    
The test based on stock returns assumes that the market is efficient in processing 
public information, or at least, its potential pricing error is not systematically related to the 
effect of fund flow pressure. Moreover, market’s assessment of observable investment 
decisions could be biased because information on mutual fund trading is not sufficient for 
investors and/or provided with a lag. In order to complement this test based on stock price 
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reaction and to better understand the consequence of bids driven by market timing reasons, I 
examine changes in operating performance after successfully completed mergers.  
I apply the Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) model to my sample of completed 
mergers from 1990 to 2009 to estimate the potential value-destruction from opportunistic 
managerial investment decisions. First, the firms are matched based on the 48 industry 
classifications from Fama and French (1997) to obtain industry-adjusted cash flow from 
operations deflated by the corresponding sales numbers. Second, average values of industry-
adjusted cash flows are calculated for both the pre-merger and post-merger periods. Each 
period encompasses the three-year measurement window before and after the merger. In the 
pre-merger period, the target and bidder performance figures are combined into one by 
weighting each with their corresponding sales from year t-3 to year t-1 relative to the merger 
completion. If information for a target is not available in the pre-merger period, I rely on 
operating performance figures of bidder firms only. In the post-merger period, I calculate the 
merged firm’s industry-adjusted cash flows from year t+1 to year t+3. I estimate the 
following OLS regression for a cross-section of completed mergers after clustering 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors at the firm-level. 
                                                                                                                  (7) 
where OPi,pre is the industry-adjusted operating cash flows deflated by sales weighted by 
sales for a combined target/bidder firm i in the pre-merger period, and OPi,post is the industry-
adjusted operating cash flows deflated by sales for a merged firm i in the post-merger period.  
According to Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992), the    coefficient captures abnormal 
operating performance increase or decrease between the pre- and post-merger periods. The 
regression uses all firms that successfully completed proposed mergers and the bids are 
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associated with fund flow pressure (i.e., FFP=1). I have a sample of 1,048 merges for which 
there are sufficient data for both pre-and post-periods.  
  The results indicate that the abnormal operating performance change over mergers 
for firms with fund flow pressure is significantly negative, with an abnormal performance 
decline of 3.2 percent with a two-tailed p-value less than 0.01 (not tabulated). I find no such 
decline for a sample of mergers which are not associated with fund flow pressure (i.e., 
FFP=0). Overall, the results based on operating performance support the announcement stock 
price reaction analysis. Moreover, the evidence based on the announcement returns combined 
with abnormal operating performance changes is consistent with the fundamental 
assumptions underpinning the agency cost explanations of overvalued equity (Jensen 2005). 
At the same time, the evidence presented here is inconsistent with neoclassical views positing 
the q-theory approach to corporate merger and acquisition investments (Jovanovic and 
Rousseau 2002).  
5.3 The Corporate Governance Role of Financial Accounting Information in Mergers 
The presence of equity overpricing captured by mutual fund flow pressure appears to 
lead to suboptimal merger and acquisition investment decisions by management. The agency 
cost hypothesis predicts that the problems caused by the presence of fund flow pressure 
increases as the incentives of the stockholders and managers diverge. Following Ball (2001) 
and Bushman and Smith (2001), I use the quality of publicly reported financial accounting 
information as a measure of the key corporate governance process ameliorating the degree of 
agency conflict found in a corporate acquisition decision. To determine whether the fund 
flow pressure effect is being attenuated by firms whose monitoring mechanisms are well 
supported by high-quality financial accounting data, I re-estimate a Logit equation for 
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predicting bidders on the COMPUSTAT sample used in Table 3. To facilitate economic 
interpretations of regression coefficients and associated marginal effects, I use an indicator 
variable representing whether a firm discloses high-quality financial accounting information. 
Specifically, HighAQ is set to one if the quality of accruals estimated based on the Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) model is in the top 20 percent of the COMPUSTAT firm-quarters each 
quarter, and zero otherwise. I then construct a new variable from an interaction of the 
presence of fund flow pressure and the accounting quality indicator variable.  
The results of the Logits are presented in Table 5. In Column (1), the coefficient on 
the interaction between fund flow pressure and high-quality accounting information is 
significant and negative (at the 10 percent level), consistent with my first prediction. The 
result shows that, in situations where firms are affected by fund flow pressure, managers are 
less likely to undertake acquisitions for firms whose managerial decisions are well 
disciplined by high-quality accounting information. In economic terms, the probability of 
being a bidder in response to equity overpricing is 0.32 percent lower for firms with high-
quality financial accounting information than otherwise similar firms. 
However, the marginal significance on the disciplining impact of accounting 
information quality on managerial empire-building incentives documented above could be a 
result of failure to control for the fact that some bids are more value destroying and are more 
likely to be driven by opportunistic reasons. In fact, there are a number of studies that suggest 
that a bidding firm’s stock prices drop upon the public release of proposed transactions 
(Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 2001). Moreover, prior studies appear to indicate that the 
managerial tendency toward a particular form of overinvestment is linked to agency 
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conflicts.
14
 Travlos (1987) finds that the wealth destruction experienced by stockholders of 
bidding firms is particularly pronounced for firms that bid for acquisitions financed with 
stock issuance. Similarly, Loughran and Vijh (1997) find that more negative long-term stock 
price performance for stock-financed acquirers continues to persist for the three-year post-
acquisition period. Furthermore, in periods when market prices are too high relative to 
fundamentals, managers of overvalued firms tend to use stock-for-stock acquisitions to 
simply expand the scope of control over corporate resources by exploiting the misvaluation 
(Shleifer and Vishny 2003). Therefore, stock-financed acquisitions are considered to be bad 
news about that firm’s agency conflict.  
I extend my examination of the governance role of financial accounting information 
quality in merger decisions by using a Logit prediction approach used above (Harford 1999). 
This approach predicts acquisition offers that are all stock and those that are all cash, 
separately. Additionally, I investigate the method of financing for an event sample of 
acquisition bids (Martin 1996; Faccio and Masulis 2005) with and without the possible effect 
of fund flow pressure. 
In Columns (2) and (4) of Table 5, I perform the Logit regression analyses after 
partitioning the dependent variable. M&A_STK (M&A_CASH) is an indicator variable set to 
one for offers that are all stock (all cash), and zero elsewhere. The findings are consistent 
with my second prediction. Specifically, the results indicate that although the interaction and 
its marginal effect on mutual fund flow pressure and high-quality financial accounting 
information are insignificant for cash offers, for stock-financed offers they are strongly 
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 In addition, the prior empirical evidence documents that negative stock price reaction to bid announcements is 
stronger for acquirers with cash reserves in excess of the amount predicted by investment opportunities, having 
a small stake of management owned equity, and where a bid is made for unrelated diversifications (Stein 2003; 
Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler 2007). These results suggest that a particular type of mergers is more likely to be 
directly driven by agency conflicts such as managerial preference toward short-termism. 
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significant and negative (at the 1 percent level). In fact, the magnitude of its estimated 
marginal effect is three times that of all cash deals and is economically significant. This 
economic significance stems from the incremental effect of accounting discipline largely 
offsetting most of the marginal probability effect caused by fund flow pressure alone 
documented in Table 3. Moreover, these Logit regressions are repeated in Columns (3) and 
(5) after controlling for the market-to-book ratio and abnormal stock returns in the pre-bid 
announcement period. The interaction effect is still significant and negative for stock-
financed acquisitions with a slight decrease in the estimated coefficient and marginal effect.  
The negative coefficient on the interaction could be affected because the precision of 
accrual estimation process is deteriorated by management intentional bias toward certain 
bright-line earnings targets and unintentional errors associated with fundamental complexity 
inherent in business models. For example, each factor provides a noise to earnings signals 
through accounting discretion and its judgment and estimation procedures, and the 
disciplining effect of financial accounting information could simply be a proxy for those two 
determinants (Dechow and Skinner 2000). In Table 6, I repeat the Logit regression analysis 
after controlling for proxies of the degree of balance sheet overstatements and fundamental 
descriptors of business models from operating environments. An array of Logit specifications 
shows that the main inferences are not sensitive to these concerns. Finally, the main 
interaction effect appears to be robust to an alternative definition of accruals quality based on 
a direct future cash flow forecasting model from Barth, Cram, and Nelson (2001). 
In addition, to examine the role of accounting information quality in making 
financing decisions, I employ the choice of funds model used in Martin (1996) and Faccio 
and Masulis (2005). The estimation uses all attempted mergers and acquisitions made by 
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U.S. public corporations from 1990 to 2009 for which data on deal-specific characteristics 
and equity holdings by block institutions and corporate insiders are available. Within this ex 
post acquisition bid sample from SDC, I estimate a Logit regression with an indicator, 
M&A_STK, set to one if a firm announces a bid and plans to finance the deal by issuing 
stock in quarter q and zero otherwise as the dependent variable. Thus, in this test, a sample of 
cash-financed acquisitions constitutes a natural control group because these acquisitions are 
attempted by managers but financed through cash instead of stock. I further partition the 
sample according to the presence of mutual fund flow pressure in any of the four quarters 
prior to the event quarter (i.e., FFP=1 and FFP=0) to isolate a situation where a potential 
divergence in interests between managers and stockholders is more likely to come into play. 
The primary variable of interest is the indicator variable representing the disclosure of high-
quality financial accounting information. 
The results on the choice of financing sources are given in Table 7. The data 
requirements leave 1,373 acquisition bids for the fund flow pressure sample and 1,432 bids 
for the non-fund flow pressure sample. As predicted by the governance view of accounting 
information quality, the probability of using all stock financing decreases with the quality of 
accounting information for the sample of firms likely subject to fund flow pressure. That is, 
in making an acquisition financing decision, a bidder’s accounting information quality serves 
as a corporate control mechanism that constrains opportunistic managerial incentives to 
exploit temporary mispricing. More importantly, this shows that in determining a method of 
financing, high-quality financial accounting information is not a proxy for other alternative 
corporate governance mechanisms such as monitoring efforts exercised by block institutions 
or by corporate insiders with a large equity stake. 
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For the non-fund flow pressure sample, high-quality accounting information does not 
seem to exhibit a significant level of monitoring functions, although other determinants of 
financing sources exert similar influence over the choice. These analyses indicate that the 
monitoring mechanisms of financial accounting information are particularly pronounced for 
firms whose managers have strong incentives to act at the expense of stockholders’ wealth.  
Overall, the evidence based on the bidder prediction model and the choice of funds 
model suggests that a takeover attempt of a bidder with fund flow pressure is disciplined by 
internal corporate accounting and external reporting systems that provide a high-quality 
public accounting signal to stockholders. Further, the results indicate that the governance 
effect is stronger for firms whose managerial investment decisions are more likely to result in 
a high-cost outcome from the perspective of stockholders of bidding firms. This is consistent 
with the general predictions of Ball (2001) and Bushman and Smith (2001), which indicate 
that the effective stockholder monitoring through accounting disclosures reduces a significant 
portion of agency costs stemming from the manager-stockholder conflict. 
5.4 Additional Tests 
The series of empirical tests discussed in the previous section tells a consistent story 
supporting the monitoring mechanisms of financial accounting information. The economic 
benefits of high-quality financial reporting include a reduction in stockholder wealth 
destruction. Moreover, the effect of accounting discipline appears to be stronger for firms 
whose management is willing to sacrifice corporate long-term values by exploiting a 
temporary overvaluation of stock price. 
 In this section, I detail two additional tests concerning the role of financial 
accounting information in disciplining managerial stock issuance decisions and in likelihood 
37 
 
of withdrawing attempted bids, respectively. First, when equity prices are overstated, 
managerial financing decisions are more likely to be driven by market-timing considerations 
(Baker and Wurgler 2002). I investigate whether high-quality financial accounting 
information ameliorates the agency conflict related to stock issuance. Second, I investigate 
whether the bidder’s accounting information quality is associated with the likelihood of 
attempted-but-failed acquisition deals. 
5.4.1 The Corporate Governance Role of Financial Accounting Information in Stock 
Issuance 
Jensen (2005) predicts that, when equity prices are overstated relative to firm 
fundamentals, managers are more likely to conduct stock issuance to exploit the temporary 
misvaluation. The excess cash generated from the market timing-driven equity issuance is 
likely to create an agency problem of free cash flows similar to that in Jensen (1986). 
However, managers of overvalued firms may prefer stock-financed acquisitions to seasoned 
public equity issuance. Managers may have this preference because the former provides an 
easy justification for a large volume of stock issuance while fulfilling management self-
interest in empire building (Stein 2003).
15
  
The test is performed exactly like the Logit specification for the case of predicting 
bidders, except that the dependent variable, SEO, is now set to one if the firm files for 
seasoned equity offerings in quarter q and zero otherwise, as recorded in SDC. This event 
sample includes all seasoned public stock offerings made by New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), American Stock Exchange (Amex), and NASDAQ firms from 1990 to 2009. The 
controls and sample selection procedures are identical to those used in the previous section. 
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 Using a large sample of U.S. public corporations from 1927 to 2003, Lamont and Stein (2006) find evidence 
consistent with a positive time-series correlation among net stock issuance, merger activity, and the degree of 
equity overvaluation. 
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The results are presented in Table 8. The interaction between the presence of fund 
flow pressure and high-quality financial reporting is negative and significant (at the 5 percent 
level). This result indicates that, in circumstances where firms are affected by fund flow 
pressure, managers are less likely to conduct public stock issuance for firms with high-
quality financial accounting information. Specifically, the likelihood of being public issuers 
in response to fund flow pressure is 0.27 percent lower for high-quality financial reporting 
firms than for other firms. The interaction effect is economically significant given the 
unconditional probability of being a public issuer is 0.88 percent and the estimated marginal 
probability of conducting seasoned equity offerings in a base model is 0.36 percent in my 
sample (not tabulated). The base model excludes level and interaction terms related to 
financial accounting information. Overall, it is likely that fund flow pressure firms that tend 
to conduct public stock issuance are largely constrained by high-quality financial accounting 
information as a control mechanism. This is similar to the role of externally reported 
accounting information in disciplining opportunistic managerial merger decisions.  
5.4.2 Withdrawal Probability and Financial Accounting Information  
The main inferences relating to the governance role of financial accounting 
information were drawn based on a sample of either completed or withdrawn merger bids. I 
argue that corporate merger and acquisition decisions motivated by managerial opportunism 
are effectively monitored by internal governance mechanisms and supporting institutional 
arrangements such as high-quality financial accounting systems. Thus, the bidder’s quality of 
externally reported accounting information is a key underlying mechanism through which 
stockholders of bidding firms avoid a high-cost outcome arising from the manager-
stockholder conflict. However, proposed takeover deals can be withdrawn if stockholders of 
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target firms (or corporate boards of target firms) refuse to approve the proposed transactions. 
For example, Malmendier, Opp, and Saidi (2012) find that more than half of failed takeover 
attempts are associated with target board disapproval of attempted bids. 
Specifically, when firms are influenced by fund flow pressure, a high-quality 
financial reporting system successfully constraining attempts for opportunistic merger bids 
decreases the likelihood of subsequent deal cancellation. On the other hand, under similar 
fund flow pressure, bids made by high-quality financial reporting firms are more likely to be 
rejected by target firms because of public availability of the bidder’s financial accounting 
information. Thus, the inclusion of failed bids to my sample will overstate the governance 
effect of financial accounting information.  
I examine the probability of deal failure as a function of high-quality financial 
accounting information. The dependent variable, WITHDRAWN, is one if the proposed bid 
is withdrawn after the public release of bid decisions as recorded in SDC. As in the test of 
choice of funds, I partition the merger and acquisition sample according to the presence of 
fund flow pressure. A sample of acquisition bids finally completed comprises a natural 
control group. 
The results presented in Table 9, however, do not show any statistically significant 
evidence of the systematic relation between accounting information quality and the deal 
completion rate. The coefficients on the high-quality financial accounting information for 
both the fund flow pressure and non-fund flow pressure subsamples are negative but 
insignificant at any conventional levels. If anything, the negative coefficient is more 
consistent with internal control mechanisms and supports the inference that financial 
accounting information effectively curbs opportunistic takeover attempts by managers. 
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6. Conclusion 
A positive correlation between merger activity and high valuation is of no particular 
interest under perfect capital markets with symmetric information between firm managers 
and stockholders. In this case, all movements in stock prices rationally reflect innovations 
either in future cash flow expectations from corporate activities, including investment and 
financing decisions, or in relevant discount rates. Thus, managers follow stock price changes 
in making important corporate decisions to maximize firm value. However, if there is 
potential mispricing by the capital markets, observed stock prices can deviate from the true 
fundamental and can increase divergence between manager and stockholder investment and 
financing interests. Specifically, the agency cost hypothesis in Jensen (2005) predicts that 
agency conflicts between managers and stockholders combined with the opportunity of 
management discretion from overstated stock prices produce corporate acquisition and 
financing decisions that diverge from the interest of stockholders.  
To test whether stock overvaluation is associated with value-destroying corporate 
decisions, I study the merger and acquisition behavior of firms that are affected by mutual 
fund flow pressure. Using a bidder prediction model used in Harford (1999), I find that firms 
are more likely to bid for acquisitions when they are affected by fund flow pressure. 
Consistent with the agency cost explanations of Jensen (2005) these acquisition bids 
attempted by fund flow pressure firms are value-decreasing. This is reflected in short-
window stock price reactions to bid announcements that are incrementally lower than other 
announcements and in a subsequent abnormal decline in operating performance of merger 
firms. 
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More importantly, I find evidence consistent with high-quality financial accounting 
information reducing a substantial amount of agency costs related to corporate merger 
decisions (Ball 2001; Bushman and Smith 2001, 2003). The probability of becoming a bidder 
in response to fund flow pressure is significantly lower for firms with high-quality 
accounting information than otherwise similar firms. I also find that the disciplining role of 
financial accounting information is mostly driven by merger bids that are financed through 
stock issuance. In a supplemental test, I provide corroborating evidence by examining a 
similar corporate control mechanism performed by high-quality financial accounting 
information in seasoned public equity offering markets. Overall, the evidence suggests that 
corporate accounting and external reporting systems that produce high-quality accounting 
signals discipline firm managers that are motivated to take advantage of temporary equity 
overvaluation. Moreover, evidence also shows that the effectiveness of control mechanisms 
supported by high-quality accounting information is particularly pronounced for firms with 
management pursuing investments that are not aligned with stockholder interests. 
The results indicating economic benefits from financial accounting information in 
merger and acquisition decisions have implications for investors, boards of directors, and 
regulators. These results may be useful in assessing valuation consequences of corporate 
investment and financing decisions. Further, my paper speaks to the academic literature on 
the role of financial accounting information in important corporate events such as mergers 
and public equity offerings (Erickson and Wang 1999; Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998). In 
sum, I demonstrate that there is an important economic link between the quality of externally 
reported accounting information and long-term performance of corporations, in part resulting 
from the effective governance of managerial myopia.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics on mutual fund trading  
This table presents the change in quarterly mutual fund holdings, ranked by actual quarterly fund flows. 
Mutual fund flows are calculated as a percentage of beginning-of-period total net assets (TNA). 
Specifically, realized mutual fund flows are measured as the percentage change in total net assets (TNA) 
over the calendar quarter period after taking into account capital gains and losses of the initial holdings: 
            
                       
       
                                                                 (1) 
where TNAj,m is the total net assets of fund j at the end of month m, and Rj,m is the return of fund j at 
month m. Then, the monthly net flows, Fund Flowj,m, are aggregated into the quarterly net fund flows, 
Fund Flowj,q, for fund j in quarter q so as to be matched with the quarterly holding data. Panel A presents 
the average realized quarterly fund flows, most recent quarter fund returns, cash holdings, and number of 
stock holdings for portfolios of firms ranked by actual quarterly fund flows. Panel B presents fund 
holding characteristics including the fraction of holdings of stocks that are maintained, expanded, 
reduced, or eliminated relative to the beginning-of-period position.  
 
Panel A. Mutual fund and fund characteristics (ranked by actual quarterly fund flows)  
Quarterly Qaurterly Average Average Number
Decile N Fund Flow (%) Fund Return (%) Cash/TNA (%) of Holdings
10 (extreme inflow ) 5,239 42.6% 4.3% 6.3% 94.7
9 5,239 11.7% 2.7% 5.7% 105.9
8 5,239 5.5% 2.4% 4.7% 116.6
7 5,239 2.4% 2.1% 4.6% 124.2
6 5,239 0.5% 1.4% 4.4% 115.7
5 5,239 -1.0% 1.1% 4.3% 108.7
4 5,239 -2.4% 0.5% 4.0% 103.0
3 5,239 -4.0% -0.1% 3.5% 104.0
2 5,239 -6.5% -0.8% 3.3% 95.0
1 (extreme outflow ) 5,238 -15.9% -1.5% 3.9% 93.0
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Panel B. Mutual fund trading behavior (ranked by actual quarterly fund flows) 
Quarterly
Decile N Fund Flow (%) Maintained Expanded Reduced Eliminated
10 (extreme inflow ) 5,239 42.6% 18.8% 52.8% 8.7% 19.4%
9 5,239 11.7% 29.8% 41.4% 11.6% 17.0%
8 5,239 5.5% 34.8% 35.0% 13.6% 16.4%
7 5,239 2.4% 40.7% 28.7% 14.6% 15.8%
6 5,239 0.5% 43.3% 23.9% 16.8% 15.8%
5 5,239 -1.0% 42.9% 20.9% 19.4% 16.6%
4 5,239 -2.4% 39.3% 19.4% 23.3% 17.8%
3 5,239 -4.0% 34.2% 18.7% 27.9% 18.9%
2 5,239 -6.5% 29.0% 17.8% 32.7% 20.3%
1 (extreme outflow ) 5,238 -15.9% 21.3% 13.6% 42.0% 22.6%
Percentage of Positions (%)
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Table 2. Summary statistics on firm and deal characteristics 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics on accounting quality metrics and selected firm characteristics, and Panel B 
presents descriptive statistics on deal-level characteristics, ownership structure, and tax benefit of debt. See 
Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
Panel A. Accounting quality measures and firm characteristics 
Standard 5th 1st 3rd 95th
Mean Deviation Percentile Quartile Median Quartile Percentile
AQ_DD -0.05 0.04 -0.14 -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01
AQ_CF -0.11 0.09 -0.29 -0.14 -0.08 -0.05 -0.02
Excess Cash 0.00 0.17 -0.19 -0.10 -0.05 0.06 0.37
Leverage 0.21 0.18 0.00 0.04 0.20 0.34 0.53
Firm Age 2.67 0.74 1.61 2.08 2.64 3.22 3.99
Size 5.50 2.13 2.18 3.92 5.39 6.97 9.31
ROA 0.00 0.04 -0.08 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05
Asset Growth 0.09 0.25 -0.25 -0.02 0.06 0.17 0.55
Sales Growth 0.09 0.32 -0.38 -0.03 0.08 0.20 0.59
Pay Dividend 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Dividend 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
Mkt-to-Book 2.64 2.56 0.57 1.18 1.86 3.09 7.41
CAR 0.05 0.63 -0.66 -0.31 -0.06 0.23 1.12
Idiosyncratic Vol 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.08
Systematic Vol 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03
NOA 0.85 1.00 0.13 0.35 0.56 0.93 2.56
Sales Vol 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.18
Cash Flow Vol 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.12
Loss% 0.25 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.40 0.90
Operating Cycle 4.71 0.73 3.41 4.33 4.77 5.18 5.78
Idiosyncratic risk
Overstated balance sheet
Operating environment
Variables
Accounting quality
Financing constraints
Performance and growth
Payout policy
Stock valuation
 
Panel B. Deal characteristics, ownership structure, and tax benefit of debt 
Standard 5th 1st 3rd 95th
Mean Deviation Percentile Quartile Median Quartile Percentile
Number of Bids 1.04 0.26 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Transaction Value 4.03 1.90 1.00 2.65 3.94 5.27 7.38
Diversifying 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Pct of Blockholders (%) 20.9 16.1 0.0 7.5 19.5 31.7 49.0
Pct of Insiders (%) 3.5 7.4 0.0 0.2 0.7 3.0 17.2
MTR (%) 31.2 7.2 12.0 32.0 34.0 35.0 35.0
Variables
Deal characteristics
Ownership structure
Tax benefit of debt
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Table 3. Predicting bidders using a Logit model 
This table presents regression summary statistics from Logit regressions. The dependent variable, M&A, is set to 
one if the firm bids for acquisitions in quarter q and zero elsewhere. FFP is set to one if firm-quarters are located in 
the top decile of Fund Flow Pressurei,q in any of the four quarters prior to quarter q, and zero otherwise. The 
definitions of other regression variables are provided in Appendix. All regressions include industry and year fixed 
effects and heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered at the firm level (Peterson 2009). Marginal 
effects of the interaction term and the respective statistical significance are calculated using the delta method (Ai and 
Norton 2003). 
***, **, and * represent the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, with a two-tailed 
test. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: M&A M&A M&A M&A
Std Err Std Err Std Err Std Err
FFP 0.219 *** 0.039 0.166 *** 0.040 0.198 *** 0.039 0.141 *** 0.040
Excess Cash 0.354 ** 0.138 0.268 * 0.138 0.311 ** 0.137 0.236 * 0.137
Leverage -1.039 *** 0.178 -0.977 *** 0.169 -0.974 *** 0.177 -0.919 *** 0.170
Firm Age -0.088 ** 0.036 -0.077 ** 0.036 -0.096 *** 0.036 -0.088 ** 0.036
Size 0.310 *** 0.018 0.311 *** 0.017 0.274 *** 0.019 0.271 *** 0.019
ROA 0.040 *** 0.007 0.032 *** 0.006 0.036 *** 0.007 0.026 *** 0.006
Asset Growth 0.444 *** 0.075 0.445 *** 0.076 0.415 *** 0.076 0.433 *** 0.078
Sales Growth 0.416 *** 0.068 0.297 *** 0.067 0.421 *** 0.068 0.301 *** 0.068
Pay Dividend -0.145 ** 0.070 -0.081 0.069 -0.158 ** 0.070 -0.108 0.069
Dividend 0.013 0.026 -0.028 0.027 0.010 0.026 -0.029 0.028
Mkt-to-Book 0.049 *** 0.007 0.046 *** 0.007
CAR 0.278 *** 0.021 0.304 *** 0.022
Idiosyncratic Vol -0.083 *** 0.017 -0.100 *** 0.017
Systematic Vol 0.102 *** 0.027 0.082 *** 0.027
FFP 0.38% *** 0.29% *** 0.35% *** 0.25% ***
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs.
Pseudo R-square 0.070 0.076 0.071 0.077
215,959 215,959 215,959 215,959
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Marginal effect
Fund flow pressure
Financing constraints
Performance/growth
Payout policy
Stock valuation
Idiosyncratic risk
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Table 4. Stock price response to bids 
This table presents regression summary statistics from OLS regressions. The dependent variables are the 3-day market-
adjusted returns based on the CRSP value-weighted market index and 3-day size-adjusted returns based on the CRSP 
size-matched portfolio returns, respectively, where the 3-day window is centered on a bid announcement date. FFP is 
set to one if firm-quarters are located in the top decile of Fund Flow Pressurei,q in any of the four quarters prior to 
quarter q, and zero otherwise. M&A_STK is set to one if the firm bids for pure stock acquisitions. The definitions of 
other regression variables are provided in Appendix. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects and 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered at the firm level (Peterson 2009). 
***, **, and * represent the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, with a two-tailed test. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable:
Std Err Std Err Std Err Std Err
FFP -0.724 *** 0.256 -0.553 ** 0.255 -0.747 *** 0.258 -0.579 ** 0.257
M&A_STK -1.108 *** 0.332 -1.085 *** 0.332
Number of Bids -0.563 0.489 -0.536 0.498
Transaction Value -0.388 *** 0.071 -0.396 *** 0.072
Diversifying 0.008 0.251 -0.044 0.251
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs.
Adj. R-square 0.010 0.025 0.009 0.024
Variables
3,909
3-day abnormal returns:
value-weighted index
Estimate
Fund flow pressure
Deal characteristics
3-day abnormal returns:
size-matched
Estimate
3,909
3-day abnormal returns:
value-weighted index
Estimate
3,909
3-day abnormal returns:
size-matched
Estimate
3,909
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
Table 5. The governance role of financial accounting information 
This table presents regression summary statistics from Logit regressions. The dependent variables include M&A, 
M&A_STK, and M&A_CASH. M&A is set to one if the firm bids for acquisitions in quarter q and zero elsewhere. 
M&A_STK (M&A_CASH) is set to one if the firm bids for pure stock (pure cash) acquisitions in quarter q and zero 
elsewhere. FFP is set to one if firm-quarters are located in the top decile of Fund Flow Pressurei,q in any of the four 
quarters prior to quarter q, and zero otherwise. HighAQ is set to one if the quality of accruals based on the Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) model is in the top 20 percent of the COMPUSTAT firm-quarters each quarter, and zero 
otherwise. The definitions of other regression variables are provided in Appendix. All regressions include industry 
and year fixed effects and heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered at the firm level (Peterson 
2009). Marginal effects of the interaction term and the respective statistical significance are calculated using the 
delta method (Ai and Norton 2003). 
***, **, and * represent the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, with a two-tailed 
test. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: M&A
Std Err Std Err Std Err Std Err Std Err
FFP 0.166 *** 0.043 0.455 *** 0.073 0.296 *** 0.077 0.128 *** 0.050 0.110 ** 0.050
FFP*HighAQ -0.182 * 0.104 -0.611 *** 0.211 -0.579 *** 0.213 -0.078 0.118 -0.069 0.117
HighAQ -0.061 0.065 -0.019 0.116 -0.028 0.116 -0.086 0.073 -0.088 0.073
Excess Cash 0.239 * 0.137 0.068 0.249 -0.110 0.245 0.413 *** 0.156 0.392 ** 0.157
Leverage -0.901 *** 0.169 -1.427 *** 0.332 -1.271 *** 0.302 -0.657 *** 0.187 -0.660 *** 0.186
Firm Age -0.088 ** 0.036 -0.204 *** 0.060 -0.183 *** 0.059 -0.059 0.041 -0.057 0.041
Size 0.274 *** 0.019 0.241 *** 0.033 0.246 *** 0.032 0.280 *** 0.019 0.278 *** 0.019
ROA 0.026 *** 0.006 -0.012 0.009 -0.015 * 0.008 0.072 *** 0.009 0.068 *** 0.009
Asset Growth 0.428 *** 0.078 0.244 ** 0.121 0.242 * 0.123 0.485 *** 0.098 0.517 *** 0.100
Sales Growth 0.303 *** 0.068 0.896 *** 0.111 0.687 *** 0.114 0.082 0.081 0.046 0.082
Pay Dividend -0.102 0.069 -0.176 0.127 -0.073 0.123 -0.143 * 0.075 -0.137 * 0.076
Dividend -0.029 0.028 0.029 0.045 -0.055 0.048 -0.004 0.029 -0.008 0.030
Mkt-to-Book 0.046 *** 0.007 0.080 *** 0.011 0.004 0.009
CAR 0.303 *** 0.022 0.415 *** 0.031 0.160 *** 0.030
Idiosyncratic Vol -0.101 *** 0.017 -0.041 * 0.023 -0.059 ** 0.023 -0.138 *** 0.024 -0.148 *** 0.024
Systematic Vol 0.079 *** 0.027 0.328 *** 0.044 0.268 *** 0.045 0.006 0.033 0.011 0.034
FFP*HighAQ -0.32% * -0.32% *** -0.30% *** -0.10% -0.09%
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs.
Pseudo R-square 0.077 0.091 0.110 0.084 0.084
Estimate
M&A_CASH
Estimate
215,959 215,959 215,959 215,959 215,959
M&A_STK M&A_STK M&A_CASH
Marginal effect
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate
Fund flow pressure
Financing constraints
Performance/growth
Payout policy
Stock valuation
Idiosyncratic risk
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Table 6. Measurement errors and equity overpricing 
This table presents regression summary statistics from Logit regressions. The dependent variables are M&A_STK and 
M&A_CASH. M&A_STK (M&A_CASH) is set to one if the firm bids for pure stock (pure cash) acquisitions in quarter 
q and zero elsewhere. FFP is set to one if firm-quarters are located in the top decile of Fund Flow Pressurei,q in any of 
the four quarters prior to quarter q, and zero otherwise. HighAQ (HighAQ_CF) is set to one if the quality of accruals 
based on the Dechow and Dichev model (the Barth, Cram, and Nelson model) is in the top 20 percent of the 
COMPUSTAT firm-quarters each quarter, and zero otherwise. The definitions of other regression variables are 
provided in Appendix. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects and heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level (Peterson 2009).  
***, **, and * represent the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, with a two-tailed test. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable:
Std Err Std Err Std Err Std Err Std Err Std Err
FFP 0.469 *** 0.073 0.489 *** 0.073 0.457 *** 0.074 0.153 *** 0.050 0.124 ** 0.049 0.134 *** 0.050
FFP*HighAQ -0.658 *** 0.214 -0.632 *** 0.211 -0.088 0.118 -0.078 0.118
HighAQ -0.019 0.117 0.032 0.118 -0.053 0.073 -0.124 * 0.074
FFP*HighAQ_CF -0.472 ** 0.206 0.039 0.117
HighAQ_CF -0.066 0.118 -0.052 0.073
Excess Cash 0.137 0.254 0.355 0.268 0.181 0.250 0.399 ** 0.158 0.479 *** 0.164 0.399 ** 0.158
Leverage -1.521 *** 0.348 -1.522 *** 0.363 -1.613 *** 0.344 -0.688 *** 0.188 -0.707 *** 0.192 -0.707 *** 0.185
Firm Age -0.231 *** 0.060 -0.190 *** 0.059 -0.220 *** 0.059 -0.037 0.041 -0.050 0.041 -0.034 0.041
Size 0.291 *** 0.035 0.301 *** 0.035 0.282 *** 0.034 0.322 *** 0.017 0.288 *** 0.018 0.321 *** 0.017
ROA -0.019 ** 0.009 -0.011 0.010 -0.015 0.009 0.081 *** 0.009 0.055 *** 0.009 0.082 *** 0.009
Asset Growth 0.400 *** 0.125 0.265 ** 0.117 0.356 *** 0.120 0.470 *** 0.096 0.475 *** 0.101 0.473 *** 0.094
Sales Growth 0.961 *** 0.115 0.863 *** 0.110 0.911 *** 0.112 0.079 0.080 0.154 * 0.088 0.070 0.079
Pay Dividend -0.258 ** 0.127 -0.207 0.130 -0.244 * 0.126 -0.092 0.075 -0.157 ** 0.075 -0.092 0.075
Dividend 0.034 0.046 0.029 0.045 0.036 0.045 -0.002 0.029 0.003 0.029 -0.001 0.029
NOA -0.122 *** 0.046 -0.007 0.031
Sales Vol 3.034 *** 0.549 -0.254 0.493
Cash Flow Vol -0.178 1.137 -2.864 *** 1.109
Loss% 0.106 0.165 -0.741 *** 0.150
Operating Cycle 0.057 0.059 -0.040 0.042
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs.
Pseudo R-square 0.088 0.090 0.086 0.081 0.084 0.081
Overstated B/S
Oper. environment
Fund flow pressure
Financing constraints
Performance/growth
Payout policy
M&A_CASH
Estimate
215,959 215,959215,959 215,959 215,959 215,959
M&A_STK M&A_STK
EstimateVariables
M&A_STK M&A_CASH M&A_CASH
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
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Table 7. Method of financing and equity overpricing 
This table presents regression summary statistics from Logit regressions on the fund flow pressure sample and non-
fund flow pressure sample, separately. FFP is set to one if firm-quarters are located in the top decile of Fund Flow 
Pressurei,q in any of the four quarters prior to quarter q, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable is M&A_STK 
being set to one if the firm bids for pure stock acquisitions in quarter q and zero elsewhere. HighAQ is set to one if 
the quality of accruals based on the Dechow and Dichev model is in the top 20 percent of the COMPUSTAT firm-
quarters each quarter, and zero otherwise. The definitions of other regression variables are provided in Appendix. 
All regressions include industry and year fixed effects and heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level (Peterson 2009).  
***, **, and * represent the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, with a two-tailed 
test. 
(1) (2)
Dependent variable:
Std Err Std Err
HighAQ -0.527 ** 0.243 0.003 0.155
Number of Bids -0.025 0.299 -0.541 ** 0.235
Transaction Value 0.439 *** 0.058 0.374 *** 0.045
Diversifying 0.183 0.157 0.142 0.115
Pct of Blockholders -0.021 *** 0.006 -0.018 *** 0.005
Pct of Insiders -0.022 * 0.012 -0.009 0.008
Excess Cash 0.646 0.496 -0.662 * 0.396
Leverage -0.686 0.592 -0.380 0.420
Firm Age -0.453 *** 0.135 -0.242 ** 0.104
Size -0.182 *** 0.069 -0.252 *** 0.057
MTR -0.026 * 0.014 -0.059 *** 0.009
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Number of Obs. 1,373 2,432
Pseudo R-square 0.445 0.343
Accounting quality
Deal characteristics
Ownership structure
Financing constraints
Tax benefit of debt
Variables Estimate Estimate
Fund flow pressure 
sample (FFP = 1)
Non-fund flow pressure
sample (FFP = 0)
M&A_STK M&A_STK
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Table 8. The governance role of financial accounting information and issuance 
This table presents regression summary statistics from Logit regressions. The dependent variable is SEO, being 
set to one if the firm files for seasoned public offerings in quarter q and zero elsewhere. FFP is set to one if 
firm-quarters are located in the top decile of Fund Flow Pressurei,q in any of the four quarters prior to quarter q, 
and zero otherwise. HighAQ is set to one if the quality of accruals based on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model is in the top 20 percent of the COMPUSTAT firm-quarters each quarter, and zero otherwise. The 
definitions of other regression variables are provided in Appendix. All regressions include industry and year 
fixed effects and heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered at the firm level (Peterson 2009). 
Marginal effects of the interaction term and the respective statistical significance are calculated using the delta 
method (Ai and Norton 2003). 
***, **, and * represent the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, with a two-
tailed test. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable:
Std Err Std Err Std Err Std Err
FFP 0.477 *** 0.060 0.453 *** 0.061 0.384 *** 0.061 0.367 *** 0.062
FFP*HighAQ -0.313 ** 0.125 -0.299 ** 0.125 -0.274 ** 0.127 -0.266 ** 0.128
HighAQ 0.049 0.076 0.050 0.076 0.043 0.077 0.043 0.077
Excess Cash 0.443 ** 0.174 0.391 ** 0.172 0.310 * 0.180 0.269 0.179
Leverage 1.750 *** 0.157 1.763 *** 0.155 1.708 *** 0.159 1.718 *** 0.158
Firm Age -0.257 *** 0.043 -0.255 *** 0.043 -0.237 *** 0.044 -0.236 *** 0.044
Size 0.088 *** 0.016 0.091 *** 0.016 0.125 *** 0.016 0.126 *** 0.016
ROA -0.038 *** 0.006 -0.034 *** 0.005 -0.043 *** 0.005 -0.041 *** 0.005
Asset Growth 0.786 *** 0.099 0.714 *** 0.099 1.016 *** 0.098 0.964 *** 0.098
Sales Growth 0.285 *** 0.090 0.251 *** 0.089 0.100 0.089 0.080 0.089
Pay Dividend -0.048 0.079 -0.008 0.079 0.008 0.080 0.032 0.080
Dividend -0.072 ** 0.034 -0.104 *** 0.035 -0.079 ** 0.034 -0.099 *** 0.035
Mkt-to-Book 0.049 *** 0.008 0.032 *** 0.009
CAR 0.692 *** 0.022 0.686 *** 0.022
FFP*HighAQ -0.27% ** -0.26% ** -0.24% ** -0.23% **
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs.
Pseudo R-square 0.049 0.050 0.083 0.084
Fund flow pressure
Financing constraints
Performance/growth
Payout policy
Stock valuation
215,959 215,959 215,959 215,959
Marginal effect
Variables
SEO SEO SEO
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
SEO
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Table 9. Withdrawal probability and financial accounting information 
This table presents regression summary statistics from Logit regressions on the fund flow pressure sample and 
non-fund flow pressure sample, separately. FFP is set to one if firm-quarters are located in the top decile of 
Fund Flow Pressurei,q in any of the four quarters prior to quarter q, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable 
is WITHDRAWN being set to one if the acquisition bid is withdrawn in quarter q and zero elsewhere. HighAQ 
is set to one if the quality of accruals based on the Dechow and Dichev model is in the top 20 percent of the 
COMPUSTAT firm-quarters each quarter, and zero otherwise. M&A_STK is set to one if the firm bids for pure 
stock acquisitions. The definitions of other regression variables are provided in Appendix. All regressions 
include industry and year fixed effects and heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level (Peterson 2009).  
***, **, and * represent the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, with a two-
tailed test. 
(1) (2)
Dependent variable:
Std Err Std Err
HighAQ -0.210 0.485 -0.040 0.206
M&A_STK 0.815 *** 0.289 1.287 *** 0.171
Number of Bids 1.354 *** 0.352 2.356 *** 0.298
Transaction Value 0.222 *** 0.079 0.107 ** 0.045
Diversifying -0.321 0.305 0.021 0.170
Number of Obs. 1,409 2,519
Pseudo R-square 0.123 0.185
Accounting quality
Deal characteristics
Variables
Fund flow pressure Non-fund flow pressure
sample (FFP = 1) sample (FFP = 0)
WITHDRAWN WITHDRAWN
Estimate Estimate
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Appendix. Variable definitions 
Variable Name Description 
AQ_DD The standard deviation of firm-level residuals from the cross-sectional estimation of 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model over a five-year rolling window and multiplied by 
minus one. To avoid the look-ahead bias caused by the use of future period cash flows, 
the accruals quality for firm i in quarter q is estimated over the fiscal year period from 
t-5 to t-1 leading up to the end of quarter q-4 [from COMPUSTAT] 
AQ_CF The standard deviation of firm-level residuals from the one-year ahead cash flow 
forecasting model from Barth, Cram, and Nelson (2001) over a five-year rolling 
window, i.e., year t-4 to t leading up to the end of quarter q–4, and multiplied by minus 
one [from COMPUSTAT] 
Excess Cash The regression residuals from a quarterly model of normal cash holdings adapted from 
Harford (1999) for firm i in quarter q-4 [see footnote 12 for a detailed description, from 
COMPUSTAT] 
Leverage The sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities deflated by total assets for 
firm i at the end of quarter q-4 [(DLTTQ + DLCQ)/ATQ from COMPUSTAT] 
Firm Age The natural logarithm of number of years since the stock is first listed in the CRSP 
monthly file for firm i at the end of quarter q-4 [from CRSP] 
Size The natural logarithm of total assets for firm i at the end of quarter q-4 [log(ATQ) from 
COMPUSTAT] 
ROA The ratio of net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations to total 
assets for firm i at the end of quarter q–4 [IBQ/ATQ from COMPUSTAT] 
Asset Growth (Sales 
Growth) 
The seasoned change in the natural logarithm of total assets (sales) for firm i from 
quarter q–8 to q-4 [seasonal changes in log(ATQ) and log(SALEQ), respectively, from 
COMPUSTAT] 
Pay Dividend The indicator variable that is equal to one if quarterly cash dividend is paid for firm i in 
quarter q–4, and zero otherwise [adj. DVY from COMPUSTAT] 
Dividend The quarterly cash dividend deflated by book value of equity for firm i at the end of 
quarter q–4 [(adj. DVY)/CEQQ from COMPUSTAT]  
Mkt-to-Book The ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity for firm i at the end of 
quarter q–4 [(CSHOQ*PRCCQ)/CEQQ from COMPUSTAT] 
CAR The market-adjusted buy-and-hold return over the period for firm i from the beginning 
of quarter q–4 to the end of quarter q–1, where the CRSP value-weighted market index 
is used as a benchmark [from CRSP] 
Idiosyncratic Vol The standard deviation of residuals from a regression of daily firm returns on value-
weighted CRSP market returns and value-weighted Fama-French (1997) 48 industry 
returns for firm i in quarter q–4 [from CRSP/Ken French’s database] 
Systematic Vol The square root of the variance of raw daily returns minus the variance of residuals 
from a regression of daily firm returns on market returns and value-weighted Fama-
French (1997) 48 industry returns for firm i in quarter q–4 [from CRSP/Ken French’s 
database] 
NOA The net operating asset, deflated by sales over the trailing four quarter window, for 
firm i at the end of quarter q-4 following Barton and Simko (2002) [(CEQQ - CHEQ + 
(DLTTQ + DLCQ)), divided by SALEQ over the trailing four quarter window from 
COMPUSTAT] 
Sales Vol (Cash Flow 
Vol) 
The standard deviation of seasoned changes in quarterly sales (cash flows), deflated by 
total assets, over the twenty-quarter rolling window for firm i relative to the end of 
quarter q-4 [quarterly sales are SALEQ/ATQ, and quarterly cash flows are (OANCFQ - 
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XIDOCQ)/ATQ. If missing, (IBQ + DPQ + RNDQ)/ATQ from COMPUSTAT] 
Loss% The percentage of quarterly losses over the rolling twenty-quarter period for firm i 
relative to the end of quarter q-4 [based on IBQ from COMPUSTAT] 
Operating Cycle The natural logarithm of the sum of days accounts receivable and days inventory in the 
most recent fiscal year for firm i relative to the end of quarter q–4 [log((RECT/SALE + 
INVT/COGS)*360) from COMPUSTAT] 
Number of Bids The total number of bidders for the same target over the period beginning 180-days 
prior to the bid announcement and ending 180-days subsequent to the announcement 
date [from SDC] 
Transaction Value The natural logarithm of deal value [from SDC] 
Diversifying The indicator variable set to one if a bid relates to a target outside the bidder’s industry 
classification, represented by the 2-digit SIC figures, and zero otherwise [from SDC] 
Pct of Blockholders 
(%) 
The percentage of shares held by institutional investors who own more than 3 percent 
of the firm’s equity. The quarterly institutional ownership data are averaged over the 
trailing four quarter period for firm i leading up to the end of quarter q-4 [from 
Thomson Financial 13-F Institutional Holdings] 
Pct of Insiders (%) The percentage of shares held by direct and indirect insiders. The data on insider 
ownership are averaged over the trailing four quarter period for firm i leading up to the 
end of quarter q-4 [from Thomason Financial Insider Holdings] 
MTR (%) The estimated marginal tax rates for firm i in the most recent fiscal year relative to the 
end of quarter q-4 following the bin approach of Blouin, Core, and Guay (2010) [from 
WRDS] 
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